This paper uses micro-level data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 14 Eastern European countries to investigate the effects of institutional, social, and individual factors on taxpayers' perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors.
Introduction
This paper investigates determinants of tax compliance behavior. I examine how institutional, social, and personal factors shape taxpayers' perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors. Behavioral research on tax compliance indicates that the standard economic theory of tax evasion (Alingham & Sandmo, 1972) does not sufficiently explain high compliance levels in the aggregate (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992) . Alm et al. argue that taxpayers comply because they value public goods and overestimate audit probabilities.
Similarly, Guala and Mittone (2005) observe "bomb crater effects" in experimental studies, where participants reduce their compliance in response to tax audits, presumably because they underestimate the probability of future audits, or because they want to make up for past losses.
Against this background, a growing body of literature explores the behavioral determinants of tax compliance. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) , for instance, differentiate taxpayers according to their motivations to comply. They assume that only a minority generally opposes paying taxes, while most taxpayers are willing to cooperate, so that different regulatory strategies should be applied to promote compliance (Braithwaite, 2003) . Likewise, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) argue that a combination of effective enforcement (power) and mutual trust between taxpayers and revenue bodies increases compliance. Audits are necessary to detect non-compliance and enforce cooperation from disengaged or reactant taxpayers, but a trusting relationship between authorities and taxpayers likely elevates voluntary cooperation and intrinsic motivations to comply. Taken together, the literature suggests that institutional, social, and individual factors affect taxpayers' willingness to comply (for an overview see Kirchler, 2007) . and Beer, Kasper, Kirchler, and Erard (2015) investigate behavioral responses to tax audits among self-employed taxpayers in the US. While audits show to have a deterrent effect on taxpayers who received additional tax assessments, sole proprietors who were not found to be non-compliant reduced their tax payments in subsequent years. Similarly, Mendoza, Wielhouver, and Kirchler (2015) observe that audits might weaken voluntary compliance when they are conducted excessively. Refining the literature on deterrence effects of audits, several authors explore the social and individual dimension of tax compliance.
3 Alm, McClelland, & Schulze (1999) , for instance, provide experimental evidence of the effects of social norms and group communication on individual reporting decisions. They find that social norms impact on tax compliance behavior. Likewise, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gaechter (2002) identify strong behavioral responses to perceptions of fair treatment. Their study participants showed a tendency to cooperate voluntarily and to punish non-cooperators, indicating that fairness considerations affect compliance behavior and reciprocity facilitates the enforcement of social norms. Wenzel (2005) investigates the dynamics between tax ethics, social norms, and motivations to comply. He finds that social norms shape tax compliance behavior only when taxpayers identify with the relevant social group, indicating a mediating effect of personal compliance norms. This is in line with findings on the effects of personal tax norms on compliance. Alm and Torgler (2006) observe a negative correlation between the degree of tax morale and the size of the shadow economy. Moreover, they find a strong relationship between tax morale and trust, supporting the assumptions of Kirchler et al. (2008) . Feld and Frey (2002) analyze the effects of political participation on tax morale and find that the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities shapes tax morale. Taxpayers trust the authorities, if they treat them fair and respectfully, which in turn has positive effects on compliance. Some scholars have moreover argued that taxpayer services educate taxpayers and thus facilitate compliance (e.g. Braithwaite, 2003) . But despite this broad body of evidence on the effects of institutional, social, and individual determinants of tax compliance, rather little is known about the relative effects of these factors on compliance behavior. This paper aims to add to the existing research by exploring the relative effects of a variety of determinants of tax compliance behavior that have been identified in the literature.
Most studies focus on few selected factors when trying to explain tax compliance, yet taxpayer behavior is a multifaceted phenomenon (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Kirchler, 2007 ). I use micro-level data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 14 Eastern European countries to investigate the impact of institutional, social, and individual factors on taxpayers' perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors.
Investigating large scale, representative survey data allows to assess a variety of behavioral dimensions that are not observable otherwise Specifically, it provides insights into perceptions of institutional factors such as the quality of public services, the effectiveness of legal systems, and tax system characteristics, social factors such as social norms and the prevalence of bribery, and individual factors such as personal norms and trust in institutions.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the data and empirical strategy. In Section 3, I present my empirical results. Section 4 discusses the main findings and concludes.
Data and empirical strategy
Data I use data from the "Public Goods through Private Eyes" (PGPE) survey 1 , an EU funded project that explores attitudes towards public goods and the state in 14 Eastern European countries 2 (Letki, 2015) . The survey was developed by an international research group and covers nine dimensions: (1) local community, (2) social trust and social cohesion, (3) personality and commitment (4) public goods, (5) institutional quality, (6) tax behavior and compliance, (7) green behavior, (8) political participation, and (9) socio-economic background. Some survey items were adapted from previous studies. The tax behavior and compliance section, for instance, comprises several questions from the tax compliance inventory (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010 
Empirical strategy
I investigate how institutional, social, and individual factors affect perceptions of power, intrinsic motivations to comply, and compliance behaviors. Despite a substantial body of literature on the determinants of tax compliance, the drivers of compliance behavior are yet not entirely clear (Alm, 2012) . Scholars have investigated the role of institutional factors such as enforcement capacity (Andreoni et al., 1998; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010) , social factors such as social norms (e.g. Alm et al. 1999 , Wenzel, 2005 , and individual factors such as individual's intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (e.g. Alm & Torgler, 2006) . But while all of these factors have been found to affect tax compliance, little is known about their relative importance in shaping taxpayer behavior. I explore large-scale survey data to investigate how these factors impact on taxpayers' attitudes and compliance choices in the aggregate. Therefore, I refrain from betweencountry comparisons in this analysis. 
Results
In the following sections I present results from OLS regressions. Five specifications are displayed for each dependent variable. The first three columns illustrate the effects of institutional, social, and individual factors respectively. Column four includes the effects of all explanatory variables except satisfaction with taxpayer services, because only a small share of taxpayers interacted with the tax office in the past year. Specification five incorporates all explanatory variables. All models control for gender, age, education, and religiousness. 
Perceived power
Regression results for perceived power are presented in Table 2 . In line with findings of Kasper, Kogler, and Kirchler (2015) , I find that institutional factors have a significant impact on perceived power (column 1). Specifically, an increase in the quality of public services, enforcement capacity, satisfaction with the tax system, effectiveness of public spending, and the absolute tax burden go along with higher levels of perceived power. The coefficient of tax system satisfaction, however, is highly significant and negative. With regard to social factors, coefficients for country level compliance and prevalence of corruption and bribery are significant The impact of tax_services on perceived power is positive and significant at the 5% level. This indicates that taxpayers who have positive experiences with the tax office perceive tax authorities as more powerful.
The number of observations is relatively small in specification five, because only few taxpayers interacted with the tax administration during the last year. However, the model explains substantially more variance than, for instance, the first three specifications, suggesting that perceptions of power are not explained by institutional, social, or individual factors alone. by Feld and Frey (2002) . Surprisingly, the coefficients of complexity and waste are positive and significant as well, indicating that the more complex the tax system and the more public funds are wasted, the higher subjects' intrinsic motivations to comply. Building on the results reported by
Intrinsic motivations to comply
Kirchler (2007) and Kogler et al. (2013) , I find that social (specification 2) and individual factors (specification 3) shape taxpayers' compliance motivations. Specifically, the coefficients of social norms (society), individual norms (compliance), and trust in institutions (trust) are highly significant and positive. Corruption and bribery (corr_brib), on the other hand, have negative and significant effects on intrinsic motivations to comply.
These results do not change substantially when considering institutional, social, and individual factors simultaneously (column 4), where besides religion, edu, and age also male shows to have a positive and significant effect on intrinsic motivations to comply. Specification 5 additionally incorporates tax_services. Being positive and highly significant, the coefficient of tax_services partly explains taxpayers' intrinsic motivations to comply. That is, respondents who report positive experiences with the tax office exhibit higher intrinsic motivations to comply. In addition to the institutional, social, and individual factors that affect respondents' intrinsic motivations to comply, the coefficient of religiousness (religion) is significant and positive. 9 Male is marginally significant (p=0.068). In comparison to the results for perceptions of power (reported in Table 1 ), the models explain a significant share of the variation in intrinsic motivations to comply with specification five accounting for almost one third of variance in the data. However, driven by the strong effects of trust and personal attitudes towards compliance, r 2 differs substantially between specification two and specification three. Individual factors explain four times more variance in intrinsic motivations to comply than social factors, indicating a potential common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) .
Non-compliant behaviors
The main results are presented in Table 4 . 
Discussion
This paper analyzes institutional, social, and individual factors to explain perceptions of tax authorities' power, taxpayers' motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors. Micro-level data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 14 Eastern European countries provides evidence that all three dimensions have significant effects on perceived power, intrinsic motivations to comply, and tax compliance behavior. These results add to a growing body of literature on the behavioral determinants of tax compliance, indicating that tax system characteristics, social norms, and individual attitudes shape taxpayer behavior. This has several implications for the design of tax policies.
First, sound administrative structures are critical. While I do not find a significant direct effect of enforcement capacity on non-compliant behavior, efficient enforcement regimes might elevate fairness perceptions and reduce the prevalence of bribery. In line with prior studies (Feld & Frey, 2002) , these factors show to affect non-compliant behaviors. Surprisingly, I find a positive effect of the effectiveness of legal systems and a negative effect of the relative tax burden on non-compliance. One potential explanation for this counterintuitive result is an unobserved factor that affects explanatory and dependent variables. Subjects with high income, 10 The coefficient of self_emp is marginally significant (p=0.052).
for instance, have a higher propensity to exhibit non-compliant behaviors. At the same time, they are more likely to use legal services to reduce their tax burden. But as the survey captures income only on the family level, I do not control for income effects.
Second, compliance behavior has a social dimension. I find that attitudes of peers are the strongest predictor of compliance behaviors. That is, the less respondents think that people they know well find non-compliant behavior acceptable, the less likely they report past noncompliance. This provides an additional perspective to the empirical observation that noncompliance is more common in some professions and less so in others.
Third, individual experiences and personal norms shape compliance behavior. The estimates indicate that personal experience with bribery increases non-compliance, whereas individual compliance norms show to have the opposite effect. Finally, I address some limitations and potential extensions of the above analysis. I investigate the relative effects of several determinants of tax compliance behavior that have been identified in the literature. However, when exploring cross-sectional data, the causality between explanatory and dependent variables might not be entirely clear. Moreover, survey studies on tax compliance behavior are sometimes criticized for their lack of external validity, as respondents tend to understate undesired behaviors, for instance. My estimates of non-compliance might thus be biased. This study, however, does not aim to estimate levels of non-compliance but to explore the relative effects its determinants. Because obtaining objective measures of these determinants is not possible in many cases, using representative survey data from several countries is instructive to obtain statistically powerful estimates of the drivers of tax compliance. 
Legal_system

Item
Factor loadings
The law in your country benefits influential people but not ordinary citizens. 0.59 One can be sure that in your country people who break the law will get punished.* 0.73 Citizens' rights in our country are well protected by law.* 0.82 In this country law is applied to everyone equally.* 0.84 Eigenvalue 2.28 % of variance 45.53 Cronbach's alpha 0.74 Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). *recoded item.
Single item scales
Item Factor
Authorities in your country, such as police, courts, or tax offices work to make people comply with the law.
Capacity
Your countries' tax system is overly complex. Complexity The tax system in your country may not be perfect, but it works well for most people. Satisfaction Your countries' tax system is unfair. Fairness The government spends taxpayers' money effectively. Effectiveness The government is wasting a lot of public money. Waste The amount of taxes you are required to pay is… Abs_burden How do you feel, in comparison with other people, are you required to pay… Rel_burden Notes: Capacity is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Fairness is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).Complexity, Satisfaction, Effectiveness, and Waste are 5-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Abs_burden is a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (no taxable income) to 6 (very high). Rel_burden is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (much lower) to 5 (much higher).
Social factors
Country
Item Factor loadings
Most people in this country always declare all their income to the tax office? 0.86 Most people in this country who work for cash in hand payments pay taxes on this income? 0.82 Eigenvalue 1.46 % of variance 48.53 Cronbach's alpha 0.62 Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes).
Society
Item Factor loadings
How common are the following types of behavior? Paying for goods or services without a bill or invoice in order to avoid VAT.
0.76
… claiming a welfare benefit one is not entitled to. 0.82 … avoiding fare on public transport. 0.72 … using personal connections to get a job for a member of one's family.
0.71 … giving a bribe to a public official.
0.78 
Corr_brib
Item
Factor loadings
Most senior public officials take bribes in return for government contracts. 0.84 Most members of parliament accept bribes in return for passing laws favoring some companies or interest groups.
0.84
Most judges and policemen take bribes in return for help with getting around the law. 0.85 Most policemen, doctors, and teachers take bribes in return for preferential treatment. 
Individual factors
Compliance
Item
Factor loadings
One should always declare all income to the tax office. 0.44 How acceptable or unacceptable do you find the following types of behavior: Paying for goods or services without a bill or invoice in order to avoid VAT.
0.73
… claiming a welfare benefit one is not entitled to. 0.80 … avoiding the fare on public transport. 0.80 … giving a bribe to a public official. 0.75 Eigenvalue 2.84 % of variance 31.59 Cronbach's alpha 0.76 Notes: Item 1 of this scale is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Items 2-5 are measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (completely acceptable) to 10 (completely unacceptable) and transformed to a 5-point scale in order to calculate the compliance scale. 
Peers
Item
Factor loadings Think about three adults you know best, like your close friends or family members. What would they think if they learnt that you did not declare all of your income to the tax office? 
Single item scales
Item Factor
Within the last couple of years was there a situation when you or a member of your family had to give a bribe?
Brib_exp
Did you earn self-employed or farming income within the last 12 months? Self_emp
Notes: Brib_exp is a dummy that takes the value of one if subjects have personal experience with bribery. Self_emp is a dummy that takes the value of one if subjects report self-employed or farming income.
Dependent Variables
Perceived power
Item Factor loadings
In my opinion the tax office carries out many audits. 0.79 I know I will be audited by the tax office.
0 
Non-compliant behaviors
Item
Factor loadings
Has it ever happened that you did not declare all of your income to the tax office? 0.86 … you claimed larger tax deductions than you were entitled to?* 0.56 … you worked for a cash in hand payment and did not pay taxes on this income? 0.82 Eigenvalue 1.73 % of variance 57.52 Cronbach's alpha 0.62 Notes: 4-point scale ranging from 0 (subjects state they never under-reported income, over-deducted expenses, or did not declare labor income in the past) to 3 (subjects state they under-reported income, over-deducted expenses, and did not declare labor income in the past). 
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B. Scales and Survey Items Variable Description
Non-compliant behaviors
Indicates non-compliant behaviors in the past (under-reporting, over-deducting, or 
